Identifying Cyber Threats and Vulnerabilities
8. Case Study : NotPetya malware
In 2017, Maersk was attacked by the NotPetya malware. NotPetya combined two powerful and virulent hacking tools: EternalBlue, which was stolen from the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) in 2017, and Mimikatz, created by a French researcher in 2011.
EternalBlue was the product of the NSA, the United States’ signals and communications intelligence agency, designed to find a vulnerability in Windows operating systems. The NSA discovered a bug in Server Message Block version 1 (SMBv1), a communications protocol for shared access among network devices. The agency exploited this bug to execute arbitrary code on Windows devices. For five years, the NSA kept this exploit, named EternalBlue, secret. In April 2017, the NSA itself was hacked, and EternalBlue was leaked. While Microsoft had released patches for newer Windows operating systems beforehand, older systems received patches only after the leak, and legacy versions of Windows received none.
Like EternalBlue, Mimikatz was originally created for other purposes. French programmer Benjamin Delpy developed it as a proof-of-concept to demonstrate that Windows passwords could be retrieved from system memory, giving attackers repeated access to a compromised device. The WDigest function, which allowed institutional users to remain logged in, was a weak point in Windows password security. Delpy was eventually coerced into revealing the Mimikatz code, which then became a standard tool for hackers.
Combining Mimikatz and EternalBlue into NotPetya, attackers only needed to plant the malware and let it spread. The entry point was Intellect Service, a local Ukrainian software firm. Their product, M.E.Doc, used by about 1 million Ukrainian businesses (80% of businesses in Ukraine) to pay taxes, became the attack vector. Attackers reportedly stole an employee’s password and exploited a server that had not been updated in four years. They elevated the user’s privileges to administrator and wrote several backdoors into company software updates. Customers receiving these updates were unknowingly infected, spreading the malware further.
M.E.Doc was installed on a Maersk computer in Ukraine with an outdated operating system no longer supported by Microsoft. Once this single machine was infected, NotPetya rapidly crippled Maersk’s systems in offices and ports worldwide. Computers shut down almost simultaneously, leaving IT staff unable to coordinate a defense. While NotPetya displayed a ransom message demanding payment to decrypt files, the attack was actually destructive. Data affected by NotPetya was permanently destroyed and could never be recovered.