6. Case Study: Maersk Recovery Journey

In 2017 NotPetya malware started to spread from one single infected Maersk computer over the whole Maersk network of computers. Maersk staff scrambled for about two hours to disconnect the company’s entire global network, in order to prevent any further spread. The company then hired the consulting firm Deloitte to manage a massive recovery operation taking place at a UK-based emergency operations center while flying in its own IT staffers from around the world for further support.

As the effort progressed, the team managed to locate backups for most of the individual servers. However, the prognosis soured as recovery workers discovered that the network’s domain controllers – approximately 150 servers responsible for mapping the network and determining which users could access the various systems – had been knocked out by NotPetya as well. Without a domain controller, Maersk’s IT team had no easy way to recover its much-needed logistical data. Maersk had programmed the domain controllers to restore their downed counterparts as a fail-safe measure but had not anticipated a situation in which all of the controllers were wiped out simultaneously. In this way, lack of both network segmentation and procedures for data recovery combined in a perfect storm.

Remarkably, Maersk’s saving grace was a blackout that temporarily disconnected one of its offices from the company’s global network. After calling hundreds of local IT staffers in offices worldwide, employees in the U.K. learned that a lone, intact domain controller lay in a remote office in Ghana. The office had coincidentally been cut off from the company network by a power outage during the time of the attack. With a single hard drive containing the key to Maersk’s recovery in hand, employees were able to begin the process of restoring its systems. While the reconstruction of Maersk’s network of 4,000 servers and 45,000 PCs took 10 days, the full recovery took nearly two months (Maersk, 2018).